This is a great graphic from the NYT Interactive Revenue Graph showing weekly revenues for movies playing through a six month period.Then there is the figure Cassey Lee and I generated of the market shares of motion pictures as they played their run against a changing slate of competitors (Stochastic Market Structure: Concentration Measures and Motion Picture Antitrust, published as a chapter in Hollywood Economics). 
They both show the same thing: revenues are complex and variable. A film may start high and fall or start small and grow. The NYT graph looks like a complex twisted rope or landscape. Our graph looks like the fractal scaling of a mountain range. Cassey and I showed that the HHI (Herfindahl Hershman Index) did not exist, thus putting the crunch on this standard way to characterize competition.
We had a hard time getting it published so I put it in the book rather than fight more referees. It may have been threatening to the game-theoretic models that assumed all sorts of coordination or signaling among studios to maintain a collusive equilibrium. As though any equilibrium exists in this wild market.
This is a great graphic from the NYT Interactive Revenue Graph showing weekly revenues for movies playing through a six month period.Then there is the figure Cassey Lee and I generated of the market shares of motion pictures as they played their run against a changing slate of competitors (Stochastic Market Structure: Concentration Measures and Motion Picture Antitrust, published as a chapter in Hollywood Economics).
They both show the same thing: revenues are complex and variable. A film may start high and fall or start small and grow. The NYT graph looks like a complex twisted rope or landscape. Our graph looks like the fractal scaling of a mountain range. Cassey and I showed that the HHI (Herfindahl Hershman Index) did not exist, thus putting the crunch on this standard way to characterize competition.
We had a hard time getting it published so I put it in the book rather than fight more referees. It may have been threatening to the game-theoretic models that assumed all sorts of coordination or signaling among studios to maintain a collusive equilibrium. As though any equilibrium exists in this wild market.